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Debts “incurred” by receivers, administrators and liquidators: 
The case for a harmonised construction of sections 419, 443A and 
556(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 
 
Mark Wellard∗ 
 
This article analyses the inconsistent approaches taken by courts when interpreting 
provisions of the Corporations Act which address debts or expenses “incurred” by receivers, 
administrators and liquidators.  After reviewing the relevant, historical judicial 
consideration of the notion of a debt “incurred”, the article contends for a consistent 
construction of these provisions which will enable the legislation to operate as was intended, 
for the benefit of persons who supply goods, services or labour to companies in external 
administration. The article explains how and why debts can be “incurred” by insolvency 
practitioners continuing on pre-existing contracts.  Specifically (and contrary to the weight of 
current authority), the article contends for a construction of ss 419 and 443A of the 
Corporations Act which renders receivers and administrators personally liable for certain 
entitlements of employees (eg, wages and superannuation contributions) which become due 
and payable by reason of the decision of a receiver or administrator to continue a pre-
existing contract rather than terminate it.    
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The notion of a debt “incurred” by an insolvency practitioner arises in a number of important 
provisions of Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”).  Those provisions 
impose personal liability upon receivers and administrators for certain debts incidental to 
trading on the business of a company (ss 419 and 443A of the Act) and afford priority status 
to certain liquidation expenses and liabilities for the purposes of distribution to creditors in a 
company’s winding up (s 556(1)(a) of the Act).    
There are common threads running through the context and scenarios in which these 
provisions apply to debts (or expenses) incurred by receivers, administrators and liquidators.  
However, courts have applied inconsistent interpretations of the notion of “incurring” a debt 
or expense, resulting in uncertainty and outcomes which sit at odds with the purpose and 
policy underlying these provisions.  This article contends that there is judicial support (if not 
good authority) for a construction of the concept of a debt or expense “incurred” which is 
consistent across the various provisions of Chapter 5 of the Act in which that word is 
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significant.  Seminal cases regarding the concept of a “debt incurred” – particularly 
judgments in insolvent trading cases relating to debts incurred by omission - have been 
overlooked or paid scant regard by the courts when construing the very same expression in 
the provisions imposing statutory personal liabilities upon insolvency practitioners.   
In particular, this paper contends for a construction of ss 419 and 443A of the Act which 
imposes personal liability upon receivers and administrators in circumstances where an 
insolvency practitioner’s decisions and actions have a truly causal link with a given debt.  A 
causation or “but for” test for determining whether a debt has been “incurred” by a receiver 
or administrator is consistent with the policy behind these two provisions – namely, that 
certain parties dealing with receivers and administrators should not be left with mere claims 
against insolvent companies but should instead have their claims effectively guaranteed by 
imposing personal liability upon the insolvency practitioner concerned.  These provisions 
were intended to ensure that certain categories of trading debts are met as a priority out of the 
assets of the relevant company which support indemnities enjoyed by receivers and 
administrators against their personal liability.1   
A causation-based construction of ss 419 and 443A would sit in harmony with the manner in 
which the courts construe both s 556(1)(a) (priority liquidation expenses incurred in a 
winding up) and s 588G of the Act (the statutory duty of directors to prevent insolvent 
trading).  This article contends that if a director’s act or omission constitutes a failure to 
prevent a debt being “incurred” by a company for the purposes of s 588G, then ordinarily it 
should stand to reason that the same act or omission of a receiver or administrator should be 
taken to constitute the “incurring” of a debt for the purposes of ss 419 and 443A.  Such acts 
or omissions could be the continuation of a terminable, pre-appointment contract which 
thereby exposes the company to further liabilities which would not otherwise have arisen.        
On occasions, courts have been unduly swayed by the fact that a particular debt arises under a 
pre-existing contract when determining whether an insolvency practitioner has “incurred” it.  
Courts have too readily concluded that a particular debt was incurred at the time the relevant 
contract (and hence the underlying obligation) was entered into by a company and failed to 
acknowledge that in some instances the receiver or administrator was perfectly capable of 
exercising a power to avoid the further liability coming to pass, but decided not to do so.  
This article serves something of a reminder that debts can indeed be “incurred” by insolvency 
practitioners continuing on the performance and operation of pre-appointment contracts.  
This article also contends that the long-held view that receivers and administrators are not 
personally liable under ss 419 and 443A for post-appointment wages payable under pre-
existing employment contracts is wrong. The significance of this question of statutory 
construction was demonstrated by the recent decision in Vickers v Challenge Australian 
Dairy Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 569 (Vickers).  In Vickers the Federal Court declined to 
uphold the personal liability of receivers under s 419 for post-appointment superannuation 
                                                          
1 Receivers will usually enjoy an indemnity under the terms of the charge pursuant to which they have been 
appointed, while administrators enjoy a statutory indemnity under sections 443D and 443E of the Act (secured 
by a lien on the company's property under section 443F). 
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entitlements payable by the company to employees whose contracts were kept on foot by the 
receivers.2  In Vickers the court followed an earlier Federal Court decision3 to conclude that 
post-appointment superannuation entitlements payable to retained workers under their 
employment contracts could not have been “incurred” by the receivers because the relevant 
contracts were pre-appointment agreements.  As will be explained below, this construction of 
s 419 runs contrary to the weight of earlier, established authority regarding the true meaning 
of a debt “incurred”.           
II DEBTS “INCURRED” BY INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS - THE 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION TO DATE 
The three significant provisions of Chapter 5 of the Act which feature the expression or 
notion of a debt (or expense) “incurred” by an insolvency practitioner are ss 419, 443A and 
556(1)(a).  Setting out the provisions in turn (for ease of reference):   
Section 419(1) provides that   
 
[a] receiver, or any other authorised person, who, whether as agent for 
the corporation concerned or not, enters into possession or assumes control of 
any property of corporation for the purpose of enforcing any security interest is, 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, but without prejudice to 
the person's rights against the corporation or any other person, liable for debts incurred by 
the person in the course of the receivership, possession or control for services rendered, 
goods purchased or property hired, leased (including a lease of goods that gives rise to 
a PPSA security interest in the goods), used or occupied. (emphasis added). 
 
Section 443A(1) provides that  
[t]he administrator of a company under administration is liable for debts he or she incurs, in 
the performance or exercise, or purported performance or exercise, of any of his or 
her functions and powers as administrator, for:  
(a)  services rendered; or  
(b)  goods bought; or  
(c)  property hired, leased, used or occupied, including property consisting of goods that 
is subject to a lease that gives rise to a PPSA security interest in the goods; or  
(d)  the repayment of money borrowed; or (e)  interest in respect of money borrowed; or 
(f)  borrowing costs. (emphasis added) 
 
Section 556(1) provides that 
 
[s]ubject to this Division, in the winding up of a company the following debts and claims 
must be paid in priority to all other unsecured debts and claims: 
(a)  first, expenses (except deferred expenses) properly incurred by a relevant 
authority in preserving, realising or getting in property of the company, or in 
carrying on the company's business; … (emphasis added) 
           
                                                          
2 The court ordered that the receivers "are not personally liable under s 419 of the Act to pay superannuation 
contributions, superannuation guarantee charges, annual leave or long service leave entitlements to employees 
of [the company] … to whom such entitlements (1) accrue, but do not become due and payable; or (2) become 
due and payable, during [the receivers’] … appointment". 
3 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392. 
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Section 556(2) relevantly defines “relevant authority” to be 
  
in relation to a company … (a) in any case – a liquidator or provisional liquidator of the 
company; … (c) in any case – an administrator of the company, even if the administration 
ended before the winding up began… .   
In construing these provisions it is important to recognise the legacy of s 588G of the Act.  
The statutory duty to prevent insolvent trading is an appropriate starting point for an analysis 
of the relevant authorities which assist in ascertaining the meaning of a “debt incurred” for 
the purposes of ss 419 and 443A of the Act.  Section 558G establishes the duty of a director 
to prevent a company from “incurring” debts in circumstances where the director suspects (or 
should reasonably suspect) the company’s insolvency or that the company would become 
insolvent by the incurring of the debt.  The current s 588G was preceded by s 592 of the 
Corporations Law and s 556 of the Companies Codes of the various states.  This legislative 
history has produced a line of significant case law and substantial judicial consideration of 
the expression “debt incurred”.  However, this case law does not appear to have been paid 
due regard by courts when subsequently construing the very same concept of a “debt 
incurred” in ss 419 and 443A of the Act.   
 
a) Judicial consideration of the insolvent trading provisions: avoidable debts 
“incurred” by omission 
A review of the judicial consideration of the insolvent trading provisions of the Act (and their 
legislative predecessors) demonstrates that Australian courts have been prepared to 
characterise a company’s debt as having been “incurred” when a director has not taken action 
which otherwise could have been taken to prevent the debt arising, accruing or coming into 
existence.  Among these early landmark judgments were the decisions in Russell Halpern 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin [1987] 10 ACLR 539, Hawkins v Bank of China (1992) 26 
NSWLR 562 (Hawkins), Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico [Nos 1 & 2] (1995) 
38 NSWLR 290 (Standard Chartered) and Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81 (Shepherd).   
Russell Halpern Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin [1987] 10 ACLR 539 was an insolvent trading 
case relating to rent falling due under a lease agreement.  (The Full Court of the Western 
Australian Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against an order striking out the appellant’s 
statement of claim.)  Burt CJ held that a liability to pay rent for the duration of an unexpired, 
pre-agreed lease term was “incurred” at the time the lease was entered into, not as and when 
each rent day came to pass:  
To hold otherwise would be to say that if a company when in all respects financially sound 
were to enter into a lease for a term of years and at some time thereafter and for reasons 
which could not be anticipated it were to fall on bad times and be unable to pay its debts, the 
directors would thereafter and on every rent day within the remainder of the term be guilty of 
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an offence for the reason that on that rent day the company “incurs a debt”. I am unable to 
accept that.4  
However, as will be discussed further below, if a lease contains a “break-clause” (entitling a 
company as tenant to unilaterally terminate the lease) then the question of when a debt for 
rent is “incurred” might be answered very differently.   
Hawkins is often cited as authority for the proposition that a contingent debt created under a 
guarantee is incurred at the time the contract giving rise to the contingent obligation (eg, the 
instrument of guarantee) is executed.  However, in Hawkins the timing of the execution of the 
guarantee was not the only determining factor in the court’s assessment of when the 
contingent debt was “incurred”.  The nature and terminability of the obligation was also 
paramount.  In Hawkins, Gleeson CJ concluded:  
The words “incurs” and “debt” are not words of precise and inflexible denotation. Where 
they appear in s 556 they are to be applied in a practical and commonsense fashion, 
consistent with the context and with the statutory purposes.  “Debt” is capable of 
including a contingent liability… .  Similarly, the word “incurs” takes its meaning from its 
context and is apt to describe, in an appropriate case, the undertaking of an engagement to pay 
a sum of money at a future time, even if the engagement is conditional and the amount 
involved uncertain. Once it is accepted that “debt” may include a contingent debt then there is 
no obstacle to the conclusion that, in the present context, a debt may be taken to have been 
incurred when a company entered a contract by which it subjected itself to a conditional but 
unavoidable obligation to pay a sum of money at a future time. This is such a case. 5  
(emphasis added) 
 
In Hawkins, the “unavoidable” nature of the obligation (to which the director had caused the 
company to commit itself) was clearly relevant to the court’s finding that a debt had been 
“incurred”.   
In Shepherd, Bryson J of the New South Wales Supreme Court had to consider precisely 
when a failed company had “incurred” certain debts because that question of timing was 
relevant to the potential liability of alleged “deemed” directors under s 556 of the Companies 
(New South Wales) Code 1981 (the predecessor of s 588G).  Bryson J (whose judgment was 
affirmed on appeal)6 discussed at some length the issue of the time when a debt is incurred.  
As regards the “avoidability” of debt obligations, Bryson J stated that: 
It was in my view essential for the decision in Hawkins’ case that the company had no 
opportunity after giving the guarantee to avoid the obligation by any action of its own, 
and could do no more than wait and observe whether the conditions including the passage of 
time were fulfilled.7  (emphasis added) 
                                                          
4 Russell Halpern Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin [1987] 10 ACLR 539, 541-542 (Burt CJ). 
5 Hawkins v Bank of China (1992) 26 NSWLR 562, 572 (Gleeson CJ). Kirby P (at 578) agreed with this 
conclusion of Gleeson CJ. 
6 Shepherd v ANZ Banking Corporation Ltd (1996) 41 NSWLR 431. 
7 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 89 (Bryson J). 
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Bryson J’s judgment in Shepherd also analysed the nature of rent obligations in considering 
the proper construction of the concept of a “debt incurred”.  Bryson J identified the notion of 
“incurring” a debt by failing to avoid it: 
If a lease contains some unusual provision such as a “break clause” under which the tenant 
had an option to terminate, it will be difficult to maintain that rent which fell due after that 
opportunity had passed was incurred when the lease was first entered into, as the company 
could have avoided the later obligation. For obligations other than rent the position must be 
addressed in the broad way indicated by Gleeson CJ in Hawkins’ case.8 (emphasis added) 
 
Bryson J also held that the statute’s reference to a company incurring a debt “did not in any 
way express an element of choice” and that the language of the provision should not be 
limited “so as to apply only to the consequences of acts or omissions of the company’s choice 
or obligations which the company chose to be involved in”.9  Indeed, Bryson J viewed 
obligations imposed by revenue law or restitution law as capable of being characterised as 
debts “incurred” for the purposes of the statute, “whether or not acts or omissions which the 
company chose to be involved in brought them into existence”.10  It is has been confirmed in 
subsequent cases that the “element of choice” is not required to constitute the “incurring” of a 
debt for the purposes of the duty to prevent insolvent trading.11 
Standard Chartered is another example of legitimate judicial emphasis being placed upon the 
fact that causative omissions (not just acts) may render a company liable for a debt.  Standard 
Chartered involved the assessment of when debts for principal and interest in respect of loans 
were “incurred”.   In a determination of the relevant principles for application, Hodgson J 
stated:    
In my opinion, a company incurs a debt when, by its choice, it does or omits something 
which, as a matter of substance and commercial reality, renders it liable for a debt for which it 
otherwise would not have been liable. This formulation [of when a company incurs a debt] 
has three aspects which could cause difficulty in particular cases: first, as to whether the 
company has a choice whether to do (or omit) the act or not; secondly, as to whether it is the 
act or omission, or something else, which renders the company liable for the debt; and 
thirdly as to whether the company would otherwise (in any event) have been liable for the 
debt.12  (emphasis added) 
Hodgson J analysed various types of obligations and debts, the “incurring” of which might be 
difficult to identify:  
[W]here there is a periodic tenancy, or a holding over after expiry of a term, the company can 
put a stop to the accrual of rent liability by giving a notice to quit and/or giving up possession; 
                                                          
8 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 89 (Bryson J). 
9 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 89 (Bryson J). 
10 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 89 (Bryson J). 
11 See ASIC v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148 (Barrett J); Powell v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433; ASIC v Plymin 
(No.1) (2003) 175 FLR 124.  It should be noted that s 588G imposes a duty on a director to prevent the company 
from incurring the relevant debt, while ss 419 and 443A impose personal liability for debts incurred by receivers 
and administrators. Under ss 419 and 443A it would seem that there must be an act or omission of the 
receiver/administrator which caused the debt to exist. 
12 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico [Nos 1 & 2] (1995) 38 NSWLR 290, 314 (Hodgson J). 
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so in those cases, in my opinion, it would be the failure from time to time to take those 
steps which, as a matter of substance, would make the company liable for each rent 
instalment accruing from a time when such a step would have stopped the rent accruing. On 
each occasion when the company could terminate the lease but does not do so, it would 
incur the rent for the period to which this omission committed the company. 
In relation to employment, the formulation would confirm that a debt for pay-roll tax is 
incurred when a company engages an employee, though the period covered by that debt 
would depend on the circumstances. It would suggest that a debt for pay-roll tax could in 
some circumstances be incurred by a failure to lawfully terminate employment, as 
suggested in Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) v Pollock. On whether a debt for pay-roll 
tax could be incurred by failing to repudiate a contract of employment, my formulation would 
focus on the questions whether the company had a choice, and whether it would otherwise 
have been liable for the debt. On the former, should a company be considered to have a 
choice whether to commit a breach of contract? And on the latter, would its liability for 
damages to the employee somehow offset its liability for the debts of wages and pay-roll 
tax?13  (emphasis added) 
As will be discussed further below, Hodgson J’s analysis - particularly in relation to 
termination of employment – is pertinent to the question of personal liability of receivers and 
administrators under ss 419 and 443A for ongoing wages and superannuation entitlements 
payable to employees retained under pre-existing employment contracts.  
In ASIC v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148 (an insolvent trading case) Barrett J reviewed the 
case law relating to the concept of “incurring” debts in the context of quantum meruit 
remuneration for building works.  Barrett J concluded: 
Case law indicates, in my view, that “incurring” is the act, omission or other circumstance 
which causes the company to owe the debt. In the present case … the situation was one in 
which [the company] … subjected itself to a liability for quantum meruit payments when, in 
response to its request, [the building contractor] … began work. From that point, [the 
company] … was party to a regime under which the performance of work by [the building 
contractor] … progressively generated rights for [the building contractor] … to be paid for 
that work.14 (emphasis added) 
In ASIC v Edwards it was material that the company (or more to the point, its directors) could 
have acted to prevent the company owing (ie, “incurring”) the debt.   
Summing up this review of relevant insolvent trading case law, it is evident that the notion 
that a failure to terminate a contract may constitute the “incurring” of a debt is supported by 
authority.  The relevance of the ability to avoid a relevant debt in determining whether it had 
been “incurred” was also evident in the courts’ early interpretation of s 419 of the Act and its 
predecessor.  However, as will be discussed below, in more recent times this approach has 
not found favour with courts assessing the personal liability of receivers under ss 419 of the 
Act for the entitlements of retained employees.  Notwithstanding that debts have plainly 
arisen by reason of a receiver’s decision to carry on (and not terminate) a pre-appointment 
contract, courts have been reluctant to countenance the personal liability of a receiver in such 
circumstances.   
                                                          
13 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico [Nos 1 & 2] (1995) 38 NSWLR 290, 314 (Hodgson J). 
14 ASIC v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148, 172 [81] (Barrett J). 
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Courts and commentators appear to have (wrongly) moved away from assessing the broader 
causative effect of an insolvency practitioner’s acts or omissions, in favour of a more limited 
view of the responsibility of receivers and administrators for their decisions to carry on pre-
existing contracts.  Current judicial attitudes to s 419 (and by extension s 443A) appear to 
make it difficult for receivers or administrators to be personally liable for debts incurred due 
to a failure to act to avoid further liabilities arising (save for leases which are specifically and 
separately addressed in ss 419A and 443B of the Act).  The weight of current Federal Court 
authority15 suggests that a receiver may decide to continue to retain an employee under an 
extant employment contract and thereby avoid personal liability for wages and 
superannuation contributions even though the “post-appointment” debts for those 
entitlements were plainly avoidable. 
b) Personal liability of receivers and administrators for “debts incurred”: ss 419 
and 443A cases relating to “avoidable” debts arising under pre-appointment 
contracts 
Sections 419 and 443A of the Act largely mirror each other in language and effect.16  Section 
419 is the older provision pertaining to receivers and served as a model provision for s 443A 
(s 443A was introduced in 1993 as part of Australia’s voluntary administration regime, Part 
5.3A of the Act).  The Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum stated of the proposed s 443A that “[t]his proposed liability is in the same form 
as that imposed on receivers by section 419 of the Corporations Law.”  Case law regarding 
the construction of s 419 has therefore been accepted as equally applicable to the 
interpretation and application of s 443A.17  Walter (2009) has contended that the language of 
s 443A can be distinguished from s 419 because s 443A does not repeat the words “whether 
as agent for the corporation or not”. 18  However, this appears to be an unpersuasive basis for 
distinguishing the provision given that s 437B expressly provides that, when performing a 
function or exercising a power as administrator, the administrator is taken to be acting as the 
company’s agent.    
It was Bryson J, just some six months after His Honour’s judgment in Shepherd, who came to 
consider s 419 in Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123 
(Whitton).  While Whitton involved the determination of a variety of issues, one which arose 
was whether the agent for mortgagee was personally liable for severance pay and long service 
leave entitlements.  Were such entitlements “incurred” by the agent for mortgagee?  Bryson J, 
in observing the proper effect of s 419, referred again to the “practical” and “common sense” 
                                                          
15 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392; Vickers v Challenge Australian Dairy Pty Ltd (2011) 
190 FCR 569. 
16 Since 2007, s 443A does however impose personal liability upon administrators in respect of a further three 
categories of debts, namely repayment of money borrowed, interest in respect of money borrowed and 
borrowing costs; see ss 443A(1)(d),(e) and (f).  See the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth).  
17 See O’Donovan, Company Receivers and Managers (Thomson Reuters subscription service) at [44.5500] 
(current to 17 May 2011).  
18 Walter, “Know your personal liabilities: Administrators’ personal liability for employee wages and 
entitlements” (2009) 17 Insol LJ 175, 182. 
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approach espoused by Gleeson CJ in Hawkins.19  Significantly, Bryson J applied something 
of a causation test for determining whether the agent for mortgagee had “incurred” the debts 
in question.  The relevant extract of His Honour’s judgment is worth setting out at some 
length to demonstrate how applying a “but for” test may assist to clarify the notion of 
“incurring” a debt for the purposes of s 419:  
The purpose of the subsection is to add a personal liability of the agent to a liability to which 
some other law subjects the corporation property of which the agent controls, and the 
expression “debts incurred by the person” is an expression, of no great precision, referring to 
debts which have come to be owed by the corporation as a result of the activities of the agent. 
…  In s 419(1) it is not sufficient to support a conclusion that an agent incurred a debt in the 
course of the receivership that the debt became due for payment while he was a receiver, nor 
is it necessarily sufficient that some of the acts or events constituting entitlement to the debt, 
whether or not they were the final precipitating acts or events, were acts of or were caused by 
the receiver. For both long service leave liabilities and redundancy liabilities, the company 
was, by 8 March 1995, in a position where, with the exception of relatively rare events which 
the company did not control such as misconduct of employees, it was inevitable that a 
liability would fall in at some time with the maturity of a chain of events which had already 
been in course for a period of some years, and in view of the company's financial difficulty 
that could well happen soon. Liability for long service leave would fall in with the grant of 
leave or termination of employment, and liability for redundancy payment could be expected 
to fall in ordinary circumstances, on the termination of employment; and while the exact 
times at which these events would happen were to a considerable extent under the influence 
of whoever was in control of the company's affairs, it was fair certainty that they would fall in 
at some time, and quite likely that that would be soon if the company could not avoid default. 
They would fall in if the company closed down or sold its business, but if the company did 
not close down or sell its business, it could be expected with a high probability that they 
would fall in at some time. Mr Whitton was in control as agent for the mortgagee for the last 
fifty days before the termination of employment, and the sale of the company's business by 
him as agent for the mortgagee was itself the result of a chain of events which were largely 
the acts of others, including the original financing, granting the mortgage and the 
circumstances which led to default. Although the final and precipitating events were his acts 
as agent for the mortgagee, it should not, in my finding, be found that the long service leave 
liabilities and redundancy liabilities were incurred by him. Mr Whitton took a relatively 
small part in the whole array of acts and conduct which brought about their payability, 
and, with fair certainty, the company was committed to their becoming payable at some 
time whether or not Mr Whitton had ever been appointed or had ever done anything.20 
(emphasis added)   
As will be demonstrated further below, this causation-based assessment of if and when a debt 
is “incurred” is consistent with the original purpose and policy of s 419.  However, in recent 
years courts have not properly imposed personal liability under ss 419 in circumstances 
where it was clear that what the receiver had (or had not) done was the very thing which 
                                                          
19 Whitton v ACN 003 266886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123, 154-155 (Bryson J). 
20 Whitton v ACN 003 266886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123, 154-155 (Bryson J). 
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brought about the distinct accrual of a further debt obligation (albeit under a pre-existing 
contract). 
In McMahon’s (Transport) Pty Ltd v Ebbage [1999] 1 Qd R 185 (McMahon’s) the 
Queensland Court of Appeal considered the question of when a receiver will have incurred a 
debt for the purposes of the predecessor of s 419, namely 324(1) of the Companies 
(Queensland) Code.  The court was asked to determine if receivers were liable for their 
occupation of factory and warehouse premises.  In considering the statutory imposition of 
personal liability upon the receivers for certain debts “incurred” by them in the course of their 
receivership, Pincus JA delivered the leading judgment and observed that the provision “must 
have been intended to make the receiver liable in circumstances where in its absence there 
would have been no liability” and that “[t]o confine its operation to circumstances in which 
the receiver has agreed, expressly or otherwise, to accept personal liability is to deprive it of 
effect.” 21  Pincus J stated that 
ordinarily a receiver would not … have become liable for rental payable by the company … 
merely by entering into and continuing in possession of the company's business, conducted on 
leased property... Merely taking and keeping possession of the company's property consisting 
in premises leased to the company does not create any liability; it is the lease agreement 
which creates the liability and, ordinarily, that liability would continue whether or not the 
company was continuously in possession during the period of the lease. But if an act done by 
the receiver, or one done on behalf of the receiver, creates a liability in the company which 
would not otherwise have existed, it appears to me that s324(1) makes the receiver 
personally liable; that is so even if the liability has its origin in a contract made by the 
company before the receivership. For example, electric power purchased with the receiver's 
authority during the period when the receiver is in possession would be a debt incurred by the 
receiver under s324(1), even if the supply has been arranged under a pre-receivership 
contract.22 (emphasis added) 
The court placed a good deal of emphasis on whether the subject debt or liability could have 
been avoided but for the receiver’s act. Building on this principle, Pincus JA drew a 
distinction between rent - which was payable regardless of any act of the receiver - and 
“outgoings” which were incurred (when they might not otherwise have been) by reason of the 
receivers’ decision to continue to occupy the premises.  Pincus JA upheld personal liability 
upon the receivers under the statute for 
the additional liability which has come into existence because of activities of the receivers - 
i.e. liability which, although it has its origin in the pre-receivership lease agreements, 
would not have accrued but for acts done by or on behalf of the receivers.23  (emphasis 
added) 
In McMahon’s, whether or not the receiver opted to have the company remain in possession 
could not affect the ongoing liability of the company to pay the rental for the pre-agreed lease 
term.  Therefore, such debt could not be said to have been “incurred” by the receiver.  
                                                          
21 McMahon’s (Transport) Pty Ltd v Ebbage [1999] 1 Qd R 185, 192 (Pincus JA).  This construction was 
accepted by Byrne J in AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 605.       
22 McMahon’s (Transport) Pty Ltd v Ebbage [1999] 1 Qd R 185, 192-193 (Pincus JA). 
23 McMahon’s (Transport) Pty Ltd v Ebbage [1999] 1 Qd R 185, 193 (Pincus JA). 
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However, the decision to occupy or not occupy did impact upon the company’s liability for 
outgoings under the lease.  While a minimal amount of outgoings were payable whether or 
not the company was in occupation (and thus were not “incurred”), the court held that the 
receivers were personally liable for the outgoings they caused to become payable by the 
continued occupation.  This distinction drawn by the Queensland Court of Appeal (and its 
underlying reasoning) is a persuasive and palatable basis upon which ss 419 and 443A of the 
Act should be applied to receiverships and administrations, including the post-appointment 
accrual of employee entitlements (discussed further below). 
The combined reasoning and dicta of the judgments in Hawkins, Standard Chartered, 
Shepherd and McMahon’s sustain a construction of ss 419 (and likewise 443A) which calls 
for a “but for” causation test to be applied in order to determine whether a debt has been 
“incurred” by reason of an act or omission of a receiver or administrator.         
In McMahon’s Pincus JA prophetically referred to the example of a receiver’s purchase of 
electricity according to terms of a pre-appointment contract.  This very situation arose for 
determination in AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596 (AGL), where the 
Victorian Supreme Court followed McMahon’s and imposed personal liability upon a 
receiver for electricity supplied to the receiver’s company under a pre-existing (pre-
receivership) supply agreement.  The court held that the supply of electricity and the charge 
(ie, obligation to pay) for the use of the electricity by the company was caused by the 
receiver’s “decision to use electricity during the receivership” and that it followed that the 
liability for the supply was incurred by the act of the receiver and not by the operation of the 
supply agreement.24  The court characterised the liability for the electricity supply as a “debt 
incurred for goods purchased” within the meaning of s 419.25  
AGL is also noteworthy for Byrne J’s discourse regarding the purpose and origin of s 419(1) 
of the Act.  Byrne J’s analysis of the purpose of the provision is equally applicable and 
relevant to s 443A of the Act which is cast in very similar language.     
c) Origin and purpose of ss 419 and ss 443A of the Act  
Byrne J in AGL made pertinent observations of how s 419 and its predecessors came to be 
part of Australia’s companies (insolvency) legislation.  Byrne J identified that the 
parliamentary debates of 1934 identified the potential mischief of a receiver “buying goods 
without paying for them and, on their being sold, giving the proceeds to the debenture holder, 
the original seller not being paid.”26  Byrne J stated that the terms of then s 311(4) of the 
Companies Act 1934 (SA) were clearly designed to prevent “the filling up of the security by a 
receiver who entered into any of the stipulated transactions on a credit basis so that the 
secured creditor recovered the fruits earned from the services, goods or property, leaving the 
supplier to rank with other unsecured creditors.” 27  
                                                          
24 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 605 (Byrne J). 
25 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 624 (Byrne J). 
26 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 606 (Byrne J). 
27 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 606 (Byrne J). 
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Byrne J also noted that the 1988 Harmer Report rejected a proposed extension of s 419 of the 
then Corporations Law, retaining the “South Australian model” which ultimately became s 
419 of the Act.28  Byrne J concluded from the historical analysis of s 419(1) that  
the court should not be astute to read the transactions in an unduly narrow way because, as 
expressed, they appear, broadly speaking, to be directed to the three principal ways in which a 
company acquires the resources with which to earn money from its commercial activities… . 
In such a case, the person who provides these resources on credit is entitled to be paid 
otherwise than by ranking with ordinary unsecured creditors of the insolvent companies.29   
As regards s 443A, the 1998 “Corporate Voluntary Administration Report” of the Legal 
Committee of The Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (1998 CAMAC Report) 
noted that the Committee had previously agreed with the conclusion of the 1988 Harmer 
Report that it was “essential to provide [a reasonable assurance of payment] to creditors by 
requiring the administrator to be personally liable”.30  The 1998 CAMAC Report also noted 
that  
[i]n deciding to impose personal liability on administrators, the Law Reform Commission 
took the following matters into account: 
• the criticisms of official management and, in some cases, schemes of arrangement for 
offering no assurance that persons who are engaged in business with a company 
under either type of administration would be paid any debt resulting from that 
business 
• the opportunity, albeit brief, for insolvency practitioners who act as administrators to 
make some preliminary assessment of the financial position of the company before 
consenting to appointment as an administrator 
• the lack of any compulsion for administrators to continue the business of a company 
or seek credit in doing so 
• the administrator’s indemnity out of the company’s assets for debts incurred.31 
This rationale of protecting post-appointment creditors has some parallels with the “priority 
payments” provision of the Act applicable to liquidation expenses, s 556 of the Act (which 
will be discussed further below).   
d) Back to first principles: Is it a “debt” which has been incurred? 
The nature of a particular liability which has arisen (whether by act or omission) may not 
always be properly characterised as a “debt”.  One would think that the basic legal dictionary 
                                                          
28 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 607 (Byrne J). 
29 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood (2003) 10 VR 596, 607 (Byrne J). 
30 Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Voluntary Administration 
Report, June 1998, [6.42], referring to ALRC 45, vol 1, para 88. 
31 Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Voluntary Administration 
Report, June 1998, [6.42]. 
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definition (“a sum of money due from one person to another”) 32  would satisfy most 
circumstances.  However, in a number of cases courts have had to grapple with the question 
of whether it was a “debt” which had in fact been incurred or rather an obligation of another 
kind:  
• In Whitton (the early s 419 case discussed above) Bryson J considered at length 
whether an employee’s accrued leave entitlement was a “debt” or an “amount due” at 
a time prior to the employee either taking a holiday or being terminated and becoming 
entitled to a payment in lieu.  Bryson J held that until either of those times, no “debt” 
existed.  This aspect of Bryson J’s judgment in Shepard will be discussed further in 
Part III below in the context of the personal liability of receivers and administrators 
under s 419 for post-appointment employee entitlements;  
• In Molit v Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 148 ALR 472 Branson J considered the 
meaning of “debt” for the purposes of an assertion that an administrator was 
personally liable under s 443A for damages occasioned by the removal (on his 
instructions) of fixtures and fittings from leased property.  In rejecting personal 
liability under the provision, Branson J held that the term “debt” is used in s 443A 
with its “usual meaning” – ie, “it does not include a claim for damages for a failure to 
comply with a covenant in a lease to make good damage caused to the leased 
premises.”33   
• In Shepard Bryson J (at first instance, affirmed on appeal) assessed whether pre-
payments and deposits for the supply and erection of kit homes (or the failure of the 
seller to honour the contracts) constituted contingent “debts” or merely the right of the 
purchaser to damages.  Bryson J held that a debt can be contingent when it is 
“incurred”.  However, His Honour stated that “there is no legal obligation to repay 
money paid for a consideration which has wholly failed until the payer has elected to 
be treated as a creditor for the money”, that “unless the payer so elects, his remedy 
and only right continues to be a right to damages” and that until that time “there is in 
my opinion, no debt, contingent or otherwise”. 34  Bryson J held that the seller’s 
obligations to pay damages could be replaced by an obligation to repay the moneys if 
the necessary election (to pursue a restitutionary remedy) is made, but that the seller’s 
obligations could not be characterised as a contingent debt.35  Bryson J’s assessment 
was upheld on appeal - the appellate court agreed that the company did not “incur a 
debt” either at the date of the acceptance of the deposits, at the expiration of time for 
performance, or at the time of appointment of a provisional liquidator.36  The New 
                                                          
32 Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (7th ed,  Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) (the author’s trusty law dictionary 
retained from his own university law school days, replete with beer stains).  Another law dictionary definition 
was cited by Muir J in Re WorkCover Queensland [2000] 1 Qd R 107, 112 (a case concerning s 443A): “A 
‘debt’ is a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money demand recoverable by action” (Stroud’s Judicial 
Dictionary, 2nd ed., p.471).   
33 Molit v Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 148 ALR 472, 474 (Branson J). 
34 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 92 (Bryson J). 
35 Shepherd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 81, 92 (Bryson J). 
36 Shephard v ANZ Banking Corporation Ltd (1996) 41 NSWLR 431. 
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South Wales Court of Appeal agreed that the restitutionary obligation was only 
“incurred” at the time the contract was discharged by election, which in that case had 
not occurred prior to the liquidation;37 
• Conversely, in Arrow Asset Management Pty Ltd v Sportsworld Group Plc [1999] 
NSWSC 1207 the relevant contract was discharged by election and the liability to 
repay a $400,000 deposit was therefore held to be a “debt” for the purposes of a s 
459E statutory demand.  The election to discharge the contract (ie, accept the 
repudiation) had given rise to a debt based upon a total failure of consideration;38                 
• In Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd (2006) 24 ACLC 471 [2006] NSWCA 26 (Box Valley) 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a District Court judge to 
exclude probable claims for unliquidated damages from the s 95A “solvency test”.  
Bryson JA referred to the appellate court’s decision in Shepherd, and also Hawkins, 
which “tend to confirm that a contingent debt may have the character of a debt, the 
central concept of which is that the amount of the obligation is liquidated.”39  Bryson 
JA stated that the decision in Shepherd “shows that an obligation which will come 
into existence only upon the exercise of an election, or which when it comes into 
existence will be an obligation for unliquidated damages, is not a debt”;40     
• In New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v AE Grant, [2008] NSWSC 1015 
(New Cap) White J determined the solvency of a reinsurer at the time of certain 
payments which were impugned by a liquidator as voidable transactions.  White J cast 
doubt upon the correctness of the reasoning in Box Valley but was duty bound to 
follow the decision in order to “give credence and effect to the decision of the 
immediately higher court, notwithstanding that it may appear to conflict with the 
decision of a still higher court”.41  The conflicting decision in question was that of the 
High Court in Bank of Australasia v Hall (1907) 4 CLR 1514 which also involved the 
determination of a debtor’s solvency.  The reference to “debt” in the insolvency test 
laid down by the then Queensland insolvency statute42 was held to carry the same 
meaning as the notion of a “creditor” – ie, being anyone able to prove in the 
bankruptcy.  On that basis, the High Court concluded that the debtor’s liability to pay 
unliquidated damages for breach of warranty and misrepresentation was able to be 
taken into account in concluding that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the 
impugned payments.43  However, in New Cap White J stated that the binding effect of 
Box Valley is that unliquidated damages for breach of contract are not “debts” for the 
purposes of s 95A of the Act, notwithstanding that the Court of Appeal in Box Valley 
                                                          
37 Shephard v ANZ Banking Corporation Ltd (1996) 41 NSWLR 431, 435 (Giles AJA) and 442 (Abadee AJA). 
38 Arrow Asset Management Pty Ltd v Sportsworld Group Plc [1999] NSWSC 1207, [15]-[23] (Macready M). 
39 Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd (2006) 24 ACLC 471 [2006] NSWCA 26, [15] (Bryson JA). 
40 Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd (2006) 24 ACLC 471 [2006] NSWCA 26, [15] (Bryson JA). 
41 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v AE Grant [2008] NSWSC 1015, [71] (White J) referring to 
Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443, 478 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
42 Insolvency Act 1874 (Qld). 
43 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v AE Grant [2008] NSWSC 1015 , [55] – [60] (White J 
discussing the High Court decision in Bank of Australasia v Hall).   
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did not “refer to other cases in which a person with a claim to unliquidated damages 
has been held to be a creditor or contingent creditor”.44 
• In Edwards v ASIC (2009) 264 ALR 723 the New South Wales Court of Appeal  
upheld the first-instance judgment of Barrett J (discussed above), confirming that a 
quantum meruit claim for the reasonable value of work done upon request is a “debt” 
for the purposes of s 588G of the Act.  The court identified a “wealth of authority for 
the proposition that a claim for the reasonable value of work done, enforceable by a 
quantum meruit action, is a ‘debt or liquidated demand’ for the purposes of court rules 
conferring procedural advantages on persons suing for debts or making demands for 
liquidated amounts.” 45   This threshold finding rendered unnecessary the separate 
determination of whether a liability for unliquidated damages is nevertheless a “debt” 
for the purposes of section 588G (which would have addressed the conflicting 
authorities of Box Valley, Bank of Australasia v Hall and New Cap).       
Therefore, the law is not entirely settled as to whether some claims or liabilities - which may 
not yet be strictly recoverable in an action for debt, such as unliquidated damages claims – 
will be “debts” for the purposes of sections 419 and 443A of the Act. Uncertainty persists as 
to the position in relation to claims or obligations which may be substituted by a liability to 
pay a sum of money under a judgment in the event that legal proceedings are brought against 
the prospective “debtor”. Such claims or obligations might be argued to constitute 
“contingent debts” in the sense enunciated by the High Court in Community Development Pty 
Ltd v Engwirda Construction Co (1969) 120 CLR 455.  As discussed further below, it is not 
just unliquidated damages claims which sit under this cloud, but also employee entitlements 
such as accrued leave which do not “convert” to a debt obligation (in lieu) until such time as 
an employee is terminated. 
e) Recent decisions rejecting personal liability of receivers and administrators 
under ss 419 for post-appointment wages 
Despite Byrne J’s exhortation in AGL to not construe s 419 in an “unduly narrow way” but 
rather to construe the provision to protect the position of persons providing resources on 
credit to companies in external administration, courts have demonstrated an aversion to 
imposing personal liability upon receivers and managers for debts accruing under pre-
existing contracts.   
In McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392 (Incat) Finkelstein J of the Federal 
Court considered a claim by employees of a company in receivership to priority payments for 
annual leave, long service leave and retrenchment entitlements.  The relevant employees had 
been retained (not terminated) by the receiver but nonetheless asserted that they were entitled, 
by virtue of ss 433(3)(c) and 558 of the Act, to be paid their accrued entitlements in priority 
to the bank’s floating charge as if they had been terminated by the receiver upon his 
                                                          
44 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v AE Grant, [2008] NSWSC 1015, [79]-[80] and [83] (White 
J). 
45 Edwards v ASIC (2009) 264 ALR 723, [81] (Macfarlan JA).  
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appointment (pursuant to s 558 of the Act).  Alternatively, the employees asserted that the 
receiver was liable for these entitlements under s 419 of the Act.   
It has always been uncontroversial that s 433 requires receivers to pay in priority to the 
claims of a floating charge-holder (now the holder of a circulating security interest)46 any 
wages, payments in lieu of notice, leave or redundancy entitlements which were due on or 
before the date of the receiver’s appointment.   The complication with the priority claims in 
Incat was that the claimed leave and retrenchment entitlements were those of ongoing 
(retained) employees, whose entitlements had not fallen due on the day of the receiver’s 
appointment.  Finkelstein J observed that the private appointment of a receiver (as agent of 
the company) does not of itself terminate contracts of employment.47  Finkelstein J stated that 
but for the operation of s 558(1) the weight of authority dictated that “neither their leave 
entitlements nor any retrenchment payments were “due” (in the sense of being payable as a 
debt) at the time the receiver was appointed.”48  Finkelstein J rejected the submission that s 
558 applies to receivership, deciding to not accept a contrary decision of de Jersey CJ of the 
Queensland Supreme Court in Re Office-Co Furniture (rec and mgrs apptd) [2000] 2 Qd R 
49.   
In relation to the alternative claim of the employees under s 419, Finkelstein J also rejected 
the imposition of personal liability upon the receiver for the leave and retrenchment 
entitlements, following the decisions in Nicoll v Cutts [1985] BCLC 322 and Sipad Holding 
ddpo v Popovic (1995) 18 ACSR 108 (Sipad Holding).49  In Sipad Holding, Lehane J held 
that s 419 could not impose personal liability upon a receiver for services rendered because 
such liability was incurred upon entry into the contracts of employment by the company prior 
to the receiver’s appointment.50  With respect, the reasoning of Lehane J in Sipad Holding 
(followed by Finkelstein J in Incat) preceded the more considered judgments delivered in the 
authorities discussed above (Hawkins, Shepherd, Standard Chartered, Whitton and 
McMahon’s) which demonstrate that the time a relevant contract was made is not the sole 
touchstone for determining when a debt arising under that contract is “incurred”.  Failing to 
terminate a pre-receivership or pre-administration contract - when there is plainly the option, 
power or ability to do so - can equally constitute a “debt incurred”.  Avoidable debts which 
accrue under pre-appointment contracts can be incurred by means of post-appointment acts or 
omissions.        
                                                          
46 By virtue of the Personal Property Securities (Corporations and Other Amendments) Act 2010) (Cth), s 433 
now refers to the “holder of any debentures of a company or registered body that are secured by a circulating 
security interest…”. 
47 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392, 395 (Finkelstein J). 
48 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392, 402 (Finkelstein J). The authorities relied upon by 
His Honour for that proposition are Love v Image Centre Pty Ltd (unreported, SC(NSW), Young J, No 1213 of 
1991, 13 Feb 1991, BC9102357) and Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (controller apptd)(in liq) (1996) 42 
NSWLR 123. 
49 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392, 404 [29] (Finkelstein J). 
50 Sipad Holding ddpo v Popovic (1995) 18 ACSR 108, 111 (Lehane J). His Honour stated: “I accept, that s 419 
of the Corporations Law cannot apply to impose a personal liability on the receiver because, on the authorities, 
any liability incurred by the … [company] for services rendered by the … [employees] was incurred when the 
contracts of employment were entered into by the company before the receiver's appointment.” 
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Nevertheless, Incat was followed by Barker J of the Federal Court in Vickers v Challenge 
Australian Dairy Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 569 (Vickers) and also by Besanko J in White v 
Norman; Re Forest Enterprises Australia Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in administration) 
[2012] FCA 33 (White).  It should be noted that neither of Incat, Vickers or White dealt with 
unpaid wages entitlements, but rather leave and retrenchment entitlements and 
superannuation contributions.  As will be explained below, the ultimate finding in Incat - that 
s 419 did not impose personal liability for leave and retrenchment entitlements – may be 
correct but for different reasons.  However, because personal liability under s 419 was 
rejected simply by reason of the fact that the receiver was carrying on a pre-existing 
employment contract, Incat is now cited as authority for the general proposition that s 419 
does not impose personal liability upon receivers for debts payable to employees for their 
services rendered under pre-appointment contracts.51  This simplistic interpretation of s 419 
is clearly at odds with the substantial body of case law (discussed above) which calls for a 
causation-based assessment of whether a debt has been “incurred”.  The correct construction 
and application of ss 419 and 443A - as the provisions apply to wages and superannuation 
entitlements payable under pre-appointment contracts - is fully articulated in Part III below.         
f) The courts’ broad construction of s 556(1)(a) liquidation expenses “incurred” 
(and the resulting inconsistency with the notion of “incurred” in ss 419 and 
443A) 
The manner in which s 556(1)(a) of the Act has been construed raises serious questions 
regarding the construction of ss 419 in Incat and Vickers.  The manner in which s 556(1)(a) is 
applied is more receptive to expenses which are payable under pre-liquidation contracts but 
which arise by reason of the liquidator’s acts and decisions.  It must be acknowledged at the 
outset that s 556(1)(a) applies to a much broader category of “expenses” than the limited 
classes of “debts” to which ss 419 and 443A apply.  However, there is no reason in principle 
why the word “incurred” in s 556(1)(a) should carry a different meaning to that afforded by 
courts for the purposes of ss 419 (and thus 443A). 
Warren J (as Her Honour then was) of the Victorian Supreme Court reviewed at length the 
background to s 556(1)(a) in Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v 
Ansett Australia Ltd (2002) 174 FLR 1 (Ansett Super).  Her Honour stated that:  
The expression "incurred" has been given an extended meaning in relation to liabilities in 
connection with obligations arising under contracts which pre-dated the relevant date. That 
extended meaning may be summarised as embracing liabilities which are incurred by reason 
of obligations retained for the benefit of the company. A discussion of such obligations is 
found in In re Toshoku Finance UK plc [[2002] 1 WLR 671, 683]. There Lord Hoffmann 
traced the origins of what had been described in earlier authorities as a discretionary 
liquidation expense principle. In rejecting the proposition that the principle conferred on 
courts a discretion to allow as expenses those costs which are not in fact expenses, his 
                                                          
51 See for example the IPA Member Handbook 2012 (Thomson Reuters, Sydney), Corporations Act 2001 
[Extracts], annotations to s 419, [419.30], p 373: “For the receiver to incur personal liability, there must be some 
act by the receiver involving entry into new contracts of employment or novation or variation of existing 
contracts…”. See also Walter, n 18, 178-179.   
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Lordship said that the principle was merely one by which the court interpreted what are the 
expenses on the facts of a given case: 
The court will of course interpret [the rule defining post liquidation expenses] to 
include debts which, under the Lundy Granite Co principle, are deemed to be 
expenses of the liquidation. Ordinarily this means that debts such as rent under a lease 
will be treated as coming within [the general paragraph applicable to expenses for 
'preserving, realising or getting in' assets], but the principle may possibly enlarge the 
scope of other paragraphs as well. ... The principle is one of general application and is 
not confined to particular types of contract.52 
Warren J further stated that “In Re Lundy Granite is the kernel of legal principle in this area 
and runs through all the authorities.”53  The principle in Re Lundy Granite Co. (1871) LR 6 
Ch App 462 (Lundy Granite) requires a landlord to receive full value for its property if 
possession of it has been retained by a company (and thus denied to the landlord) “for its own 
purposes, and with a view to the realisation of the property to better advantage”.54   
Warren J also accepted the decision of Austin J in Bell v Amberday (2001) 39 ACSR 25 in 
which His Honour accepted that the expression “incurred by a relevant authority” in s 
556(1)(a) includes debts incurred by a liquidator as agent for the company as well as 
personally or as principal (“relevant authority” being defined in s 556(2) to include a 
liquidator or a preceding administrator).55  In a footnote to Her Honour’s judgment in Ansett 
Super Warren J stated:  
An important expression in para(a) [of s 556(1)] is the use of the words "incurred by a 
relevant authority". Under s 556(2) the term "relevant authority" is defined. The definition 
ensures that in para (a) the subject expenses are those incurred by the company through a 
variety of agents: see Bell v Amberday (2001) 19 ACLC 1439. Unlike other provisions in the 
Corporations Act para(a) does not impose or require any personal liability by the relevant 
authority.56  
More recently (again in the context of a lease) in Timbercorp Securities Ltd (in liq) v 
Plantation Land Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 620 (Timbercorp), Finkelstein J considered whether 
rent accruing under a pre-appointment lease during the period of a winding up was payable as 
a liquidation expense under s 556(1)(a) of the Act.  Finkelstein J reviewed the cases which 
have established the “Re Lundy Granite principle” and stated:  
The point of these cases is that distress for rent is allowed when the liquidator has “elected” to 
retain possession of the leased land … Whether or not the liquidator has elected to retain 
                                                          
52 Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd (2002) 174 FLR 1, [287] 
(Warren J). 
53 Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd (2002) 174 FLR 1, [308] 
(Warren J). 
54 Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd (2002) 174 FLR 1, [307] 
(Warren J citing James LJ in In Re Lundy Granite Co. (1871) LR 6 Ch App 462, 466). 
55 Bell v Amberday (2001) 39 ACSR 25, 37 (Austin J stated that “[T]he subsection specifically extends to 
expenses incurred in carrying on the company's business, and it would be unduly restrictive to confine it to 
business expenses for which the liquidator undertakes personal liability. The words "incurred by a relevant 
authority" are capable of applying where the relevant authority incurs the expense as agent, and I see no reason 
for adopting any other constructions). 
56 Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd (2002) 174 FLR 1, [179] 
(footnote 108). 
     
19 
 
possession (that is whether or not he has decided to do so) may involve a subjective 
assessment of the state of mind of the liquidator but, more usually, will be determined 
objectively based on what the liquidator has said and done …  The principle (no longer 
confined to distress) was discussed at length by the House of Lords in Re Toshoku Finance 
UK plc [2002] 3 All ER 961 ; [2002] 1 WLR 671 ; [2002] UKHL 6. Lord Hoffman, with 
whom the other Law Lords agreed, said that the early cases establish that debts arising out of 
pre-liquidation contracts, such as leases, whether they accrue before or after the liquidation, 
should prima facie be proved in the liquidation. They are debts “crucially different” from 
normal liquidation expenses, which are incurred after the liquidation date and cannot be 
proved. But as Lord Hoffman explained (at [29]) “on equitable grounds, the concept of a 
liability incurred as an expense of the liquidation [may] be expanded to include liabilities 
incurred before the liquidation in respect of property afterwards retained by the liquidator for 
the benefit of the insolvent estate”. This was not to say that a liability has been incurred as an 
expense of the winding up. Lord Hoffman said (at [27]) that in that circumstance it is “just 
and equitable … to treat the rent liability as if it were an expense of the winding up” and to 
accord it the same priority”.57 
On the facts, Finkelstein J determined that the liquidators had not yet “elected or chosen to 
retain possession of the leased land for the purposes of the liquidation”.  Thus, the rent falling 
due for payment in the post-appointment period was, pending an election or decision of the 
liquidator, not an expense incurred by the liquidator within the meaning of s 556(1)(a) (nor 
for that matter within the meaning of s 556(1)(dd)).58  
g) Wages payable to retained employees under s 556(1)(a): Application of the 
Lundy Granite principle or simply an expense truly “incurred”?  
In Timbercorp, while Finkelstein J rejected the application of s 556(1)(a) to the rent payable, 
His Honour also stated that the landlord could force the liquidators hand “by serving a notice 
under s 568(8) requiring the liquidators to elect within 28 days (or any longer period allowed 
by the court) whether or not to disclaim the leases.” 59   Finkelstein J’s observation 
demonstrates that, in light of a liquidator’s power of disclaimer, a causation-based 
construction of an expense “incurred” in s 556(1)(a) may apply in the alternative to achieve 
the same, equitable result as the application of the Lundy Granite principle.  Indeed, the 
characterisation of the Lundy Granite principle by Lord Hoffman in Re Toshoku Finance 
appears to overlook the fact that a debt can be properly characterised as having been 
“incurred” by reason of the failure of a liquidator to utilise the power of disclaimer to avoid 
further debts arising under a pre-existing contract.        
Taking a lease as the immediate example, a causation-based approach to construing the 
meaning of “incurred” in s 556(1)(a) in relation to post-appointment rent assumes a unique 
complexion because of the existence of the liquidator’s power of disclaimer under the Act.  
Unlike a receiver or administrator, a liquidator has a statutory power to unilaterally bring a 
lease to an end and terminate the company’s obligations under it, thereby “avoiding” the 
                                                          
57 Timbercorp Securities Ltd (in liq) v Plantation Land Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 620, 625 (Finkelstein J). 
58 Timbercorp Securities Ltd (in liq) v Plantation Land Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 620, 626 (Finkelstein J).  
59 Timbercorp Securities Ltd (in liq) v Plantation Land Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 620, 626 (Finkelstein J). 
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accrual of any further debt for ongoing rent.60  In effect, the power of disclaimer is a de facto, 
statutory “break clause” available to the liquidator of a corporate tenant.  Failure to exercise 
this power - once the liquidator has had a reasonable opportunity to do so - would surely 
render ongoing rent an “expense incurred” under s 556(1)(a) according to the causation (or 
“but for”) test of “incurred” as advocated in this article. 
The recent Victorian Supreme Court case of Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape 
Exchange Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112 (Grapecorp) is another example of how a causation 
test or approach may be applied to determine whether a particular debt is a s 556(1)(a) 
liquidation expense.  Grapecorp involved a dispute as to expenses and fees payable by a 
company (in liquidation) under an agreement for the provision of maintenance, harvesting, 
management and marketing services in respect of a vineyard.  Sifris J had to determine 
whether expenses and fees payable under the agreement fell within s 556(1)(a).  Sifris J 
discussed the “liquidation expenses principle” derived from Lundy Granite in respect of 
“debts arising under contracts entered into with a company prior to liquidation” and noted the 
decision of Finkelstein J in Timbercorp.61 His Honour then stated that:  
[t]he application of the principle is not limited to distress. Nor is it confined to cases where a 
liquidator continues to occupy land. In Re Mesco Properties Ltd Brightman J held that a 
liability for capital gains tax from the sale of property prior to liquidation was a cost in the 
liquidation. Further, and more relevantly, a liquidator’s election not to disclaim an 
ongoing contract for services may result in the charges for those services being 
liquidation expenses.62  (emphasis added) 
Sifris J ultimately held that because the liquidators had not disclaimed or terminated the pre-
existing contract - but rather wilfully agreed that it remain “on foot and in full force and 
effect” - debts which accrued under the contract in the winding-up period were “expenses 
incurred” for the benefit of the liquidation within the meaning of s 556(1)(a):  
[N]otwithstanding that the liabilities were incurred under a pre-liquidation contract, the 
liquidators elected that they be incurred by [the company] … initially for the purposes of 
the administration and then the liquidation.63  (emphasis added) 
While Sifris J clearly gave significant weight to the fact that the liquidators’ election was 
demonstrated by a specific written agreement, His Honour also opined that one of the 
liquidators “rightly conceded when giving evidence that … the continuance of the 
[contract] … was ‘convenient’.”64  Grapecorp is a good illustration of how a causation-based 
approach to the statutory concept of a debt or expense “incurred” can provide the same result 
as an application of the ancient (and somewhat more nebulous) Lundy Granite principle.    
                                                          
60 Of course, in the event of disclaimer the landlord’s right to the future rental stream will convert to a right to 
prove for its loss as a debt in the winding up: s 568D(2) of the Act. 
61 Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape Exchange Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112, [81] – [88] (Sifris J). 
62 Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape Exchange Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112, [89] (Sifris J). Sifris J 
cited In re Mineral Resources Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 746 as authority for the proposition in the last sentence of 
this extract of His Honour’s judgment. 
63 Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape Exchange Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112, [115] (Sifris J).  
64 Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape Exchange Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112, [109] (Sifris J). 
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Turning to the matter of employee wages, it is generally accepted that wages for employees 
retained by a liquidator fall within s 556(1)(a) notwithstanding that such wages may be 
payable under pre-existing contracts. 65 Liquidation expenses in the way of wages would 
appear to be another example of “debts arising out of pre-liquidation contracts” referred to by 
Finkelstein J in Timbercorp, to which the Lundy Granite principle would ostensibly apply.  In 
respect of such employment contracts it is again arguable that a “but for” (or “avoidability”) 
test for ascertaining if and when those debts are “incurred” would yield the same result as an 
application of the Lundy Granite principle.  According to the reasoning of Lord Hoffman in 
Re Toshoku Finance, the Lundy Granite principle would dictate that equity intervene to deem 
wages payable to employees retained under pre-existing employment contracts to be 
liquidation expenses, even though they were actually “incurred” prior to the liquidation.  
However, with the greatest of respect to the doyen insolvency law judge, why could it not be 
said that such wages are in fact plainly “incurred” by a liquidator who has made the election 
not to terminate an employment contract but rather to keep it on foot?      
The Lundy Granite principle has clearly influenced Australian courts’ construction of s 
556(1)(a) of the Act.  The result is that the accepted construction of “incurred” in s 556(1)(a) 
stands at odds with that applied to s 419 in Sipad Holding, Incat and Vickers.  It might be 
argued that in Incat and Timbercorp Finkelstein J interpreted the respective notions of “debt 
incurred” (s 419) and “expense incurred” (s 556(1)(a)) according to the different context and 
historical case law relevant to each provision.  However, are the purposes of ss 419, 443A 
and 556(1)(a) (including the Lundy Granite principle) and the notion of a debt or expense 
“incurred” expressed in those provisions all that far apart?  The key contextual differences 
between receivership, administration and liquidation were accounted for by the parliamentary 
draftsman in limiting ss 419 and 443A to specific classes of debts (as opposed to the broader 
ambit of s 556(1)(a) expenses).  It is respectfully contended that there is no justification for 
displacing the ordinary rule of statutory construction that the same word (“incurred”) should 
have the same meaning where it is used throughout these three provisions.66   
The current disharmony of statutory interpretation could plainly be resolved by courts 
reverting to the sensible, causation-based approach to the meaning of “incurred”, as 
enunciated by the well-considered judgments in McMahon’s, Shepherd, Standard Chartered 
and Whitton.  A future appellate court may well have an opportunity to correct the long-
standing anomaly that s 419 has not been applied to impose personal liability upon receivers 
for post-appointment wages of employees whose employment contracts are continued in 
order to trade-on a company’s business.   
 
                                                          
65 McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidation (Thomson Reuters subscription service) at [13.700], current to 6 
November 2012, cited with approval by Sifris J in Grapecorp Management P/L (In liq) v Grape Exchange 
Euston P/L [2012] VSC 112.  McPherson’s appears to make no distinction between voluntary or compulsory 
liquidations or whether employees are retained under pre-existing contracts or employed under fresh contracts 
following an implied or express dismissal.    
66 Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon (1975) 132 CLR 611; [1975] HCA 41; McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v. 
Smith (1978) 144 CLR 633 (per Gibbs CJ: “The rule that the same words which occur in different parts of a 
statute have the same meaning is one which “must yield to the requirements of the context: Madras Electric 
Supply Corporation Ltd v Boarland [1955] AC 667 at 685”). 
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(h) Voluntary administration followed by liquidation:  why are post-appointment 
wages taken to be “incurred” by the administrator as a “relevant authority” 
under s 556(1)(a) but not under s 443A?  
As regards post-appointment employee wages, the courts’ anomalous construction of ss 419, 
443A and 556(1)(a) is further highlighted by the manner in which the Act is said to operate 
when a voluntary administration is followed by liquidation.  While Incat would dictate that 
an administrator does not “incur” wages payable under continued employment contracts for 
the purposes of s 443A (and is therefore not personally liable for them), in any subsequent 
liquidation of the same company it is generally accepted that those wages would be expenses 
“properly incurred” by the administrator as a “relevant authority” for the purposes of s 
556(1)(a).  This “saving grace” operation of s 556(1)(a) has even been cited in support of 
Finkelstein J’s construction of s 419 in Incat (ie, any harsh result from denying employees 
recourse to the administrator for their wages is ameliorated by the manner in which s 
556(1)(a) “picks up” the wages as a first-priority liquidation expense).  As Walter (2009) 
contends:  
Further, in the event that the company is wound up, there can be no doubt that any amounts of 
wages or entitlements that are due to the employees, which are referable to work performed 
during the administration, would be expenses properly incurred by a relevant authority (the 
administrator) in carrying on the company's business for the purpose of the priority conferred 
by s 556(1)(a) of the Corporations Act. … It follows that employees will not be left in a 
position where their post-administration wages and entitlements are somehow de-prioritised 
in the event that the company subsequently proceeds into liquidation. Of course, if the 
liquidator pays his own remuneration and expenses in advance of employees' post-
administration claims (in circumstances where those items rank pari passu), the liquidator will 
become personally liable to pay those employee claims.67 
However, as Taylor (2000) has pointed out, this is cold comfort to an employee in the 
unlikely event that there are no company assets to meet the liquidation expenses.68  Indeed, 
isn’t the risk of such an event the very purpose and policy behind s 443A?  Following Incat, 
it appears anomalous, if not odd, that wages for post-appointment work are not taken to have 
been “incurred” by an administrator under s 443A, but then once the administration transits to 
liquidation those same wages are taken to have been “incurred” by that same (preceding) 
administrator for the purposes of s 556(1)(a).69  Surely the better view is that such wages 
were “incurred” by the administrator under s 443A in the first place?         
 
III APPLYING A CAUSATION TEST OF LIABILITY UNDER SS 419 AND 443A: 
WHY RECEIVERS AND ADMINISTRATORS ARE LIABLE FOR POST-
APPOINTMENT WAGES AND SUPERANNUATION (AND POTENTIALLY 
LIABLE FOR ACCRUED LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS) 
                                                          
67 Walter, n 18 at 183-184. 
68 Taylor T, “Employee Entitlements in Corporate Insolvency Administrations” (2000) 8 Insolv LJ 32, 41. 
69 Section 556(2) of the Act defines “relevant authority” to include an administrator. 
     
23 
 
As contended above, a causation-based approach to the statutory construction of the 
expression “debt incurred” in ss 419 and 443A is supported by authority and would establish 
consistency in the application of these two provisions alongside s 556(1)(a) of the Act.  For 
the reasons which follow, a causation test for assessing liability under ss 419 and 443A would 
usually render receivers and administrators personally liable for wages and the 
superannuation entitlements of employees retained for post-appointment work.  It is 
respectfully contended that Incat and Sipad Holding are not good authority for construing ss 
419 and 443A to not impose personal liability in circumstances where a receiver or 
administrator decides to retain an employee under the terms of their employment contract 
rather than effect a termination.  The authorities discussed above (McMahon’s, Shepherd, 
Standard Chartered, Whitton, ASIC v Edwards) all espouse the notion of “incurring” 
avoidable debts under pre-existing contracts. 
Walter (2009) has argued that wages for post-appointment work are not “incurred” by an 
administrator under s 443A, citing the decisions in Incat, Hawkins, Sipad Holding, Green v 
Giljohann (1997) 17 ACSR 518 (Green) and Associated Newspapers v Grinston (1949) 66 
WN (NSW) 211 (Grinston).70  However, in Green and Grinston the courts assessed the 
question of whether a debt had been “incurred” simply by asking whether personal 
responsibility for the relevant contract of employment had been assumed by any variation or 
novation.  Such a construction of s 443A (or s 419) gives the provision very little work to do 
and for that very reason was rejected in both McMahon’s and AGL.71   Concluding that a debt 
was not “incurred” simply because the insolvency practitioner was “merely carrying out the 
contract”72 is not the correct assessment called for by ss 419 or 443A.   
a) Implicit support for s 419 personal liability for post-appointment wages under 
pre-appointment contracts  
It is worth noting that there are instances of practitioners and courts proceeding on the basis 
(without authoritatively deciding) that post-appointment wages are “debts incurred” within 
the meaning of ss 419 and 443A:  
• In Whitton, the agent for mortgagee issued a notice to employees stating: “My 
obligation as agent for the mortgagee in possession of the business assets of … [the 
company] only requires that I pay your wages from the time of my appointment.”  
Bryson J, in reference to the notice stated that “[i]t opens with a reference to his 
obligation to pay wages from the time of appointment; clearly a reference to s 419 of 
the Corporations Law.”;73 
 
• In Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers’ Union v Terranora 
Lakes Country Club Pty Ltd (1996) 19 ACSR 687 court leave was sought under s 
                                                          
70 Walter, n 18 at 178 and 182. 
71 See n 21 above.  
72 Associated Newspapers v Grinston (1949) 66 WN (NSW) 211, 212-213 (Street CJ), referred to by Walter, n 
18 at 178. 
73 Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123, 150-151 (Bryson J). 
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440D of the Act to commence proceedings against a company in administration – 
specifically, to seek an injunction to restrain the voluntary administrator from 
terminating the employment of company employees.  Davies J refused leave, 
observing that “the existence of the personal liability of the administrator weighs with 
me.” Davies J noted s 443A of the Act and that “[o]rdinarily, because there is 
personal liability on the part of the administrator, urgent steps are taken to reduce the 
outgoings.”  The administrator had given notices terminating the employment of part-
time and full-time employees and informed casual employees that they would not be 
required for casual employment.  Davies J stated: 
 
I assume that the steps complained of have been taken because the outgoings are too 
great, because the Company is not trading at a profit, indeed trading at a loss, and 
because steps should be taken to bring the Company back into a profitable position if 
that can be done. … It may be that there is an outstanding question as to whether or 
not the terminations were in breach of the award. … If there is doubt about it, then it 
is an issue which, it seems to me, would be proper to go to the Industrial Relations 
Court to be ruled upon by the court. It is a different thing, however, to seek an order 
which, if granted, would, in effect, impose a personal liability upon the administrator 
arising from the continuance of the employment of employees whom he has 
determined should be dismissed.74 
 
• In Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) 
(1998) 153 ALR 643 (Patrick), the High Court (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ) referred to the previous interlocutory orders which were the 
subject of the appeal and appeared to presume - without considering or deciding the 
issue which was not argued – that Part 5.3A administrators would ordinarily be 
personally liable for post-appointment wages: 
 
Further, the orders (as varied by the Full Court) are intended to relieve the 
administrators of personal liability for the wages that the employees of those 
companies will earn pending the trial of the action.75       
The issue of unpaid post-appointment wages may not often arise in practice.  Receivers and 
administrators may pay such wages without conceding their personal liability to do so 
(presumably the ongoing co-operation and service from employees will not be forthcoming if 
they are not being paid).76  However, as Vickers demonstrates, the flawed construction of ss 
419 and 443A following Incat can result in a very real and practical loss to employees in 
respect of superannuation contributions attributable to their post-appointment work.  While 
these superannuation entitlements may ultimately be recovered in any subsequent liquidation, 
these are the very kinds of debts ss 419 and 443A were intended to “guarantee” for parties 
                                                          
74 Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers’ Union v Terranora Lakes Country Club Pty Ltd 
(1996) 19 ACSR 687, 688-689 (Davies J). 
75 Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 153 ALR 643, 662 [46] 
(Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
76 See Vickers v Challenge Australian Dairy Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 569, [44] (Barker J: “The receivers are 
continuing to pay wages of continuing employees so no practical issue arises with respect to such wages”). 
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(such as employees) who effectively extend credit to receivers and administrators of 
companies.  The intention of enacting ss 419 and 443A was that suppliers and employees 
should not have to rely on s 556 to see payment for the goods or services they have provided 
on credit to enable a receiver or administrator to trade on.    
b) Powers and discretions of receivers and administrators: the application of a 
causation test for whether a debt is “incurred” under ss 419 and 443A in respect 
of post-appointment wages 
A causation-based construction of ss 419 and 443A would determine personal liability for a 
debt according to whether it could have been avoided by – ie, whether it was truly caused by 
- an act or omission of a receiver or administrator.  Under this “but for” test, the powers of a 
receiver or administrator relating to the contract giving rise to the debt are critical. Assessing 
what options were open to avoid the debt in question will be a central consideration in 
ascertaining whether the insolvency practitioner has “incurred” a relevant debt.   
Upon appointment the immediate tasks of a receiver or an administrator involve a timely 
assessment of the company’s position and the exercise of broad powers.  One of the early 
threshold decisions a receiver or administrator will often make is whether to continue or 
cease trading.  Receivers and administrators enjoy extensive contractual and/or statutory 
powers and discretions to carry on the company’s business or alternatively to “shut the 
doors”.77  In respect of administrators the High Court in Patrick observed:     
An administrator has the power to carry on trading though the company is insolvent, the 
personal liability of the administrator being the protection given by the Corporations Law to 
the company's creditors. But the statutory protection of the creditors generally cannot be set 
aside by a court's order in litigation between a plaintiff party and the company purporting to 
suspend s 443A of the Corporations Law; nor can a court order an administrator to incur, or to 
run the risk of incurring, a personal liability under s 443A in order to preserve the rights of a 
plaintiff against the company. The administrator must act impartially as among all parties 
having or claiming to have an interest in the present or future assets of the company and must 
make those decisions which, in the light of contemporary circumstances, best serve those 
interests. It is for the administrator, in exercise of the discretionary powers conferred by 
s 437A, to decide whether or not to carry on the company's business and the form in which it 
should be carried on during the administration.78 
To complement this “ultimate” discretion, receivers and administrators possess a range of 
more specific, “operational” discretionary powers.  Subject to the terms of the charge under 
which a receiver is appointed, section 420(2)(o) of the Act provides a receiver of property of 
a corporation with the power (for the purpose of attaining the objectives of appointment) to 
“engage or discharge employees on behalf of the corporation”.  Most standard charges will 
also provide a receiver with the power and ability to terminate employment contracts (and the 
                                                          
77 See ss 420(2)(h), 437A(1)(a)-(d) and 442A of the Act and (in respect of administrations) Patrick Stevedores 
Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 153 ALR 643, 663 [52] (Brennan CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
78 Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 153 ALR 643, 663 
[52] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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ongoing liabilities they entail).  Similarly, an administrator has clear power upon appointment 
to discharge employment contracts.  While the High Court in Patrick held that administrators 
“must obey the general law in exercising their discretions, including the law governing the 
dismissal of redundant employees”, the High Court was also clear that the discretionary 
power of an administrator is not subject to prior court approval.79   
Decisions are therefore often made by receivers and administrators as to how many (and 
which) employees to dismiss or retain and whether to dismiss and re-employ any workers on 
new contracts with fresh terms.  It is commercially and legally unreal for a receiver or 
administrator to wilfully approve a worker’s continued employment, allow the company to 
enjoy those services rendered and then maintain - somewhat opportunistically - that the 
wages payable are not debts “incurred” under ss 419 or 443A because the contract was 
executed pre-appointment.  If a director mounted such an argument in defence of an insolvent 
trading claim under ss 588G and 588M of the Act, it would presumably receive short shrift 
from a court. Such a construction of ss 419 and 443A should be treated with similar doubt.  
Given that many external administrations result in redundancies carried out by receivers and 
administrators, it is artificial to maintain that the hands of these insolvency practitioners are 
somehow tied or that they are hostages to the continuing liabilities created by their own 
continuation of employment contracts. 
Unlike a lease, a receiver or administrator can usually take unilateral action in respect of 
employment contracts if there is an operational reason or justification for absolving a 
company of the further liability to pay for the services rendered under the contract.  A 
receiver or administrator will not take such action where continuing an employment contract 
is necessary or desirable to trade on the business for the benefit of the receivership or 
administration.  This commercial reality is itself a policy argument in favour of construing ss 
419 and 443A to impose personal liability upon receivers and administrators for debts created 
by carrying on contracts where the receiver/administrator has forgone the alternative of 
avoiding the ongoing liability.  This construction is consistent with the purpose and policy 
underlying s 419 (and s 443A) as identified by Byrne J in AGL and also sits in harmony with 
s 556(1)(a) and the Lundy Granite principle.   
The power and capability of receivers and administrators to “avoid” ongoing, accruing debts 
to employees was recently demonstrated by a receivership in Victoria in the automotive 
sector.  The receivers of a company operating a car parts supply business “stood down” 
employees without pay – an action available under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in 
exceptional circumstances to enable an employer to avoid liability for wages while an 
assessment is made as to the future viability of operations and/or trading.80     
                                                          
79 Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 153 ALR 643, 665 
[62] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
80 Lucas C, “126 jobs in limbo at Coburg car components supplier”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 2012.  
One of the receivers was quoted in the media report as stating ''it has been necessary for [us] to stand down 
without pay the company's employees as there are not sufficient funds for us to meet payroll or other operating 
costs.''  
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Despite the exhortations of both Gleeson CJ in Hawkins and Hodgson J in Standard 
Chartered to apply the words “incur” and “debt” “in a practical and commonsense fashion”, 
and to assess whether a debt has been incurred “as a matter of substance and commercial 
reality”, it appears that commentators and judges have construed ss 419 and 443A in a 
manner which runs contrary to the context and purpose of the two provisions.  Hawkins 
remains good authority for the proposition that a debt for a guarantee is incurred at the time 
the guarantee is executed.  However, Hawkins is prone to slavish application when construing 
ss 419 and 443A in a manner which is too fixated with (or coloured by) the presence of a pre-
appointment contract.  There is nothing inconsistent with the court’s decision in Hawkins and 
the “but for” causation test for a debt “incurred” as espoused in McMahon’s, Shepherd, 
Standard Chartered and AGL - indeed, quite the contrary. A contingent debt created by an 
instrument of guarantee cannot, once executed, be unilaterally extinguished by the guarantor.  
However, receivers and administrators can (and commonly do) elect to either avoid their 
companies accruing further debts for ongoing employee entitlements, or alternatively to allow 
such further debts to be “run up” in the interests of trading on.       
c) Applying the causation test of ss 419/443A liability to leave and retrenchment 
entitlements  
In Incat Finkelstein J addressed the assertion that s 419 was “an alternative source of 
liability” on a receiver to pay accrued annual leave, long service leave and retrenchment 
entitlements.81  Finkelstein J might have been able to reject the s 419 claim on alternative 
grounds to those which His Honour relied upon. 
Finkelstein J rejected the imposition of personal liability under s 419 simply by reason of the 
fact that the employment contract was executed prior to the receivership (which for reasons 
already discussed, is respectfully contended to be an incorrect construction of s 419 and the 
notion of a “debt incurred”).82  However, the relevant leave and retrenchment entitlements 
(not being wages) were arguably not debts incurred “for services rendered”.  As identified by 
Walter (2009), applying the reasoning of the Victorian Supreme Court in International 
Harvester Co v International Harvester Australia Pty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 539 to s 443A and 
“entitlements that accrue to employees during the administration period”:  
it follows that there cannot be any personal liability for an administrator under s 443A of the 
Corporations Act for those types of entitlements. This is because the entitlements are not paid in 
respect of services rendered – rather, in the language used in International Harvester Co, the period of 
service merely provides a measure of the amount of a particular entitlement to which that employee is 
entitled.83While that reasoning is clear in its application to retrenchment entitlements, the 
characterisation of leave entitlements might be more vexed.  It might be said that leave 
entitlements are – like retrenchment payments – merely measured by reference to the period 
of service rather than paid for the services rendered.  However, it could also be argued that 
                                                          
81 McEvoy v Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 392, 404 (Finkelstein J). 
82 To reject personal liability under s 419, Finkelstein J relied on the reasoning of Lehane J in Sipad Holding 
ddpo v Popovic (1995) 18 ACSR 108 to the effect that the relevant liability was "incurred" upon the company 
entering into the employment contracts, not by the receiver during the post–appointment period. 
83 Walter, n 18, 179. 
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the innate nature of leave of absence - its underlying policy or rationale being that 
“employees should have a break from work on a regular basis”84 - renders that entitlement so 
incidental to the work performed by an employee that it must surely be characterised as 
accruing “for services rendered”.  But even accepting the latter view (and to muddy the 
waters even further), do leave entitlements constitute contingent “debts” as and when they 
accrue?          
In Incat Finkelstein J referred to Whitton as providing guidance on the nature of an accruing 
leave entitlement – namely, that no amount is “due” for such an entitlement until termination 
of an employee.  In Whitton Bryson J observed that the agent for mortgagee had in fact paid 
employees “what he and they regarded as appropriate sums for accrual of annual leave 
entitlements” for “the period during which he was in control of the company's affairs and the 
employees were in employment”, but paid employees nothing for accrued annual holiday 
entitlements up to the date of his appointment. 85  Assuming that such entitlements are 
properly characterised as being “for services rendered”, was the approach of the agent for 
mortgagee in Whitton to leave entitlements consistent with a causation-based assessment of 
personal liability for “debts incurred” within the meaning of ss 419 and 443A? 
Notwithstanding that leave entitlements may not become due as a “debt” payable until a 
future date, by retaining employees for post-appointment service a receiver or administrator 
will cause leave entitlements to accrue – entitlements which will become payable at a later 
date if the leave is not taken prior to termination.  As observed by Bryson J in Whitton (and 
noted by Finkelstein J in Incat):  
[I]t cannot be said of an accruing leave entitlement, which had not … reached the point where 
there was either grant and acceptance of a holiday carrying with it the right to pay holiday pay 
during the holiday, or a termination of employment on which a sum of money was payable in 
lieu of the holiday, that any amount was due …  Something was due, but it was not a debt or 
an amount; it was an accruing entitlement to a holiday, for which payment on termination of 
employment was substituted if employment was terminated, and it was not a debt, or an 
amount.86 
It would appear, therefore, that accrued leave entitlements cannot be properly characterised as 
a contingent “debt” prior to an employee’s termination.  A receiver or administrator retaining 
an employee can cause a company to be “further obliged” to grant either a paid holiday or 
make a payment in lieu upon termination.  However, the prospect of an accrued entitlement 
being converted to a debt obligation is - similar to the scenario in Shepherd – not sufficient to 
attract personal liability for that mere accrual.  In Shepherd, pre-payments (deposits) made by 
a purchaser were found to not constitute a contingent “debt” as such, but rather the mere 
prospect of a possible election by the purchaser to terminate the contract and assert a 
liquidated claim in restitution for a total failure of consideration.   
 
                                                          
84 McGrath v Sturesteps (2011) 284 ALR 196, 209 [56] (Bathurst CJ).  
85 Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123, 148 (Bryson J). 
86 Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 42 NSWLR 123, 148 (Bryson J). 
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Therefore, whether leave entitlements which accrue during a post-appointment period 
constitute “debts incurred” under ss 419 or 443A may depend upon whether the receiver or 
administrator effects a termination of the relevant employee.  If a receiver retires after a 
period of being in possession and control of a company’s business, the leave entitlement of a 
retained employee which has accrued for the period of receivership - but which has neither 
been taken as a paid holiday nor “paid out” by reason of any termination - would probably 
not constitute a “debt”, let alone a “debt incurred”.  If on the other hand a receiver retains an 
employee for, say, one month and then terminates that employee, any accrued leave 
entitlement - including that attributable to the period of the receivership - will convert to a 
right to payment in lieu and constitute a “debt”.  It is contended that the amount attributable 
to the receivership period would then constitute the debt (or part thereof) which the receiver 
has “incurred” by reason of having continued the pre-existing employment arrangements and 
subsequently terminating them.  In Whitton the end of the period in which the agent for 
mortgagee was in control of the company’s affairs was marked by a sale of the business, 
upon which the relevant employees were terminated.  Thus, it appears that the controller in 
Whitton took the view that the employees at that time became entitled to a payment of a debt 
(in lieu) and that – as a matter of causation - the controller should accept personal liability 
under s 419 for so much of that debt as was attributable to his period of management and 
control.         
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
There is authority for a consistent, causation-based construction of the concepts of a “debt 
incurred” in ss 419 and 443A of the Act and an “expense incurred” in s 556(1)(a) of the Act.  
Early insolvent trading cases which established the principled basis of such an approach have 
been subsequently overlooked by judges and commentators alike.  More recent decisions 
have shown that courts are applying different constructions of these three provisions in a 
manner which prevents their harmony of operation and purpose. The inconsistent application 
of ss 419, 443A and 556(1)(a) is unhelpful, creates unnecessary confusion and produces 
flawed outcomes (witness the unpaid superannuation contributions in Vickers for which the 
receivers were not answerable).  Consistency in interpretation and application was surely 
intended by the legislature when it enacted three provisions in Chapter 5 of the Act with the 
common reference to a debt or expense “incurred”.   
 
A causation test to determine personal liability under ss 419 and 443A need not cause alarm 
or concern for insolvency practitioners.  As the 1998 CAMAC Report noted, receivers and 
administrators invariably have the opportunity to conduct a preliminary assessment of the 
financial position of the company before accepting an appointment, so that the strength of 
their indemnity secured by the company assets can be ascertained.  An administrator may 
also apply under s 447A of the Act to be relieved of any personal liability imposed by s 443A 
if the circumstances justify such an order.  Indeed, it is easy to lose count of the number of 
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recent cases where orders varying or limiting s 443A liability have been made in favour of 
administrators.87        
  
If courts and practitioners pay due regard to the commercial and legal reality that some debts 
are indeed “incurred” by the continuation of pre-appointment contracts, it may be that ss 419, 
443A and 556(1)(a) can work with greater certainty and security for those who supply 
insolvency practitioners with goods, services and labour for the benefit of all forms of 
external administration.         
 
                                                          
87 For some examples see Re Mentha (2010) 82 ACSR 142, Re Secatore, in the matter of Fletcher Jones and 
Staff Pty Ltd (Admrs Apptd) [2011] FCA 1493, Re Robinson, in the matter of Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty 
Ltd (Admrs Apptd) [2012] FCA 833 and Re Gould Bros & Co Pty Limited (Admrs Apptd) [2012] FCA 285.  
